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**Affecting Market Efficiency
by Increasing Speed of Order Matching
Systems on Financial Exchanges
– Investigation using Agent Based Model**

Takanobu Mizuta	SPARX Asset Management Co., Ltd.
<u>Yoshito Noritake</u>	Daiwa SB Investments Ltd.
Satoshi Hayakawa	Osaka Exchange, Inc.
Kiyoshi Izumi	The University of Tokyo

(1) Introduction

(2) Artificial Market Model

(3) Simulation Results

(4) Summary & Future Works

The speed of order matching systems has been increasing due to

- Competition between Financial Exchanges
- Their investors' demand

(Example of Speedup of an order matching system)

Tokyo Stock Exchange's Arrowhead (Started from 2010)	Latency (length of time required to transport data and match orders)
Before Launch	3,000ms (3 seconds)
After Launch	<u>4.5ms</u>

Opposite Opinions in Increasing Speed

Good Point

Increasing market liquidity so that investors can trade without delay and large execution costs



conflict

Bad Point

Increasing maintenance costs of systems imposed to a Financial Exchange

What is the sufficient speed of
Financial Exchange's System ?

Artificial Market Simulation (Multi-Agent Simulation)



- How much speed does a Market system need?

- No Market system implemented further high-speed:
Impossible to verify by using empirical study (historical data)

- If system's speed effect market efficiency, what are the mechanisms?
- Can investor buy or sell a stock around its fair (fundamental) price regardless of its speed?

- Need to analyze Micro Process, but too many factors may affect stock's price: Empirical study cannot isolate the pure contribution of speed

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- * **Continuous Double Auction**: as the real stock exchanges
- * **Simple Agent model**: to avoid an arbitrary result

heterogeneous 1,000 agents

each agent places an order 10,000 times

Expected Return

$$r_{e,j}^t = \frac{1}{\sum_i w_{i,j}} \left(\underbrace{w_{1,j} \log \frac{P_f}{P^t}}_{\text{Fundamental}} + \underbrace{w_{2,j} r_{h,j}^t}_{\text{Technical}} + \underbrace{u_j \varepsilon_j^t}_{\text{noise}} \right)$$

$w_{i,j}$

Strategy Weight
different for each
agent

Order Process

$$P_{o,j}^t \sim N(P_{e,j}^t, P_\delta) \text{ where } P_{e,j}^t = P^t \exp(r_{e,j}^t)$$


$$P_{e,j}^t > P_{o,j}^t \Rightarrow \text{Buy}, \quad P_{e,j}^t < P_{o,j}^t \Rightarrow \text{Sell}$$

Replicate traditional Stylized Facts and Micro Structures

Latency has Micro Structure Time Scale, Millie Seconds

Latency

Time-lag required for data transfer and/or matching orders (The most important factor of Market's speed)



$\delta l / \delta o > 1$ (slow)

True Price
(in Matching System)

Observed Price
(by Agent)

Difference

Order & Price change

True and Observed prices are different

Key Variables



Latency
constant = δl

$\delta l / \delta o \ll 1$ (fast)

Order & Price change

In most cases, an agent knows True Latest Price

Order interval = δt
exponential
random numbers
Avg. = δo

Market Inefficiency

Market Inefficiency

$$= \frac{\text{Time Avg. of } |\text{Market Price} - \text{Fundamental Price}|}{\text{Fundamental Price}}$$

The Market Inefficiency is based on difference between market and fundamental prices.

If the price in the stock market highly deviates from its fundamental, the market was not consider to be efficient.

→ But we don't know the “true” fundamental price in real financial markets, so we can't assess correct inefficiency by empirical studies.

We can directly measure Market Inefficiency, by defining its Fundamental Price (=10,000) in Artificial Market Simulation.

Independent of time period used to calculate return


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
Market Inefficiencies



$\delta l / \delta o > 1$: Inefficient


Right side $\delta l / \delta o \geq 0.5$, Market becomes Inefficient

Bid Ask Spreads (per Fundamental Price)




$\delta I / \delta o > 1$: Wider Bid Ask Spread

Execution Rates (= Orders executed immediately / All orders)



$\delta I / \delta O > 1$: Increasing Execution Rate

Execution Rates for each True Prices around the Fundamental Price



Increasing Execution Rate especially near the Fundamental Price ($P^t \sim P_f$), where Technical term (r_h^t) dominates an expected return of an agent

- Execution rates and Average Expected Returns of all agents* compared by $\delta I / \delta o = 10, 0.001$ and Relationship between Observed and True prices (slow market only)

$\delta I / \delta o$	Relationship between Observed and True prices	Execution Rate			Avg. Expected Return of agents
		Total	Buy Market Sell Limit Orders	Sell Market Buy Limit Orders	
10 (slow)	True P. > Observed P.	32.5%	28.9%	3.5%	0.28%
	True P. < Observed P.	32.5%	3.6%	28.9%	-0.27%
0.001 (fast)	---	31.2%	15.6%	15.6%	0.00%

*Population of data: all executions and orders

In a slow ($\delta I / \delta o$) market...


True Price > Observed : Positive expected returns, Upward trend expectation

True Price < Observed : Negative expected returns, Downward trend expectation

(In a slow market)

Observed Price < True Price

Observed Price > True Price



Too High Expected Price
⇒ Market Buy order

Too Low Expected Price
⇒ Market Sell order


A trend has actually been finished around Fundamental Price.

But, agents cannot quickly modify their expected prices.

Agents then place unnecessary market orders.

Agents wouldn't place such orders if they knew the true price.

Mechanism of Large Latency ($\delta l / \delta o > 1$) making Market Inefficient



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Summary

- * The ratio ($\delta l / \delta o$) is key parameter,
Latency (δl) per Average of Order interval (δo)
- * the sufficient speed of Exchange's System is $\delta l < \delta o$ (δt).
- * Trend stops in slow market (with Large Latency)
 - > agents cannot change Estimate price, quickly
 - > Unnecessary market following trades near fundamental
 - > Increasing Execution Rate -> Expanding Bid Ask Spread
 - > Market becomes Inefficient

Future Works

- * We should discuss it with more kinds of agents and situations. (example: High Frequency Trading Agents, Crowded Orders immediately after great market impacting information)

Appendix


A little difference from actual market

All agents decide an order price

sell		order book		buy	
		sell	price	buy	
limit	84	101	market	Exist matching order Order executed immediately	
	176	100			
market		99	2	limit	No matching order Order not executed immediately
		98	77		

Agents decide an order price,
if exist matching order, market order else limit order

Difference in Makert Inefficiency
(from $\delta l / \delta o = 0.001$)



$\delta l / \delta o > 2$: be Inefficient significantly