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An interaction between a leveraged ETF and futures in  
a crash investigated by an agent-based model



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(1) Introduction

(2) Our Model

(3) Simulation Results

(4) Conclusion

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(1) Introduction

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
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## Leveraged ETF (L-ETF)

ETF = Exchange Traded Funds is an investment fund traded on stock exchanges, much like stocks

A Leveraged ETF is designed to deliver several times the return of its benchmark index (future), e.g. S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, FTSE 100, Nikkei 225



Actually, Leveraged ETF has to trade the index on daily to maintain its leverage

Rebalance

# Rebalance to maintain its leverage

For example, when the index returns are +10% on day 1 and -10% on day 2  
The Leverage is twice (x2)

Days	Index	Leveraged ETF (x2) is Designed as		Leveraged ETF (x2) Holding Index (future) Value		
	(a) Return	(b) Return = 2x(a)	(c) Value Will be by (b)	(d) <b>Should</b> have = 2x(c)	(e) <b>Will</b> be by (a)	(f) Rebalance = (d)-(e)
0			\$100	<b>x 2</b>	\$200	\$200
1	+10%	+20%	\$120	<b>x 2</b>	\$240	\$220
2	-10%	-20%	\$96	<b>x 2</b>	\$192	\$216

So, leveraged ETF

Buy the futures when its price goes up  
Sell the futures when its price goes down

This leads

Momentum  
Trading

This momentum trading Rebalance concern some people,

This Rebalance makes Financial Market Unstable?

## Difficulty of Empirical Study

There are many empirical studies that produce both opposite results

### Difficulty of Empirical Study

Empirical studies cannot be conducted to isolate the pure contributions of L-ETFs due to the many diverse factors affecting price formation in actual markets



**Artificial Market Model**

can


agent-based model for a financial market

# An artificial market model = an agent-based model for a financial market

## Virtual and Artificial financial Market built on Computers

Models  
Include

Agents (Artificial Investors)  
+  
Price Mechanism (Artificial Exchange)



Each Agent determines an order by some rules, Price Mechanism gather agents orders and determines Market Price

## Complete Computer Simulation needing NO Empirical Data

- ✓ can isolate the pure contributions of L-ETFs
- ✓ can be conducted to investigate situations that have never occurred in actual financial markets
- ✓ can effectively handling micro-macro feedback loops

## Previous Studies by Artificial Market Models

[Yagi 2016]

When a L-ETF impacts market prices more than their volatility  
Market will be crushed

[Yagi 2020]

Using a continuous double auction  
Investigated rebalance-trades to less impact to market prices

However, no previous study implemented a market in which a L-ETF itself is traded in an artificial market model and investigated effects of falling market prices of L-ETFs to those of futures.

Therefore in this study

[Yagi 2020]

+

L-ETF market  
Arbitrage Agent

We investigated that sharply falling of the futures or the L-ETF affects the another market and effects of rebalancing trades of the L-ETF



(1) Introduction


(2) Our Model

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
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# Overall view of our model



# Continuous Double Auction



	Shares	Price	Shares
	Sell		Buy
Waiting Orders	10	103	
	30	102	
		101	
	50	100	
	130	99	
	98		150
	97		
	96		70

When sell order come here transaction immediately occurs


When buy order come here transaction immediately occurs

Multiple buyers and sellers compete to buy and sell stocks in the market, and transactions can occur at any time whenever an offer to buy and an offer to sell match.

# Normal Agents (NAs)

1000 agents

j: agent number ordering in number order  
t: tick time



This term is needed To replicate stylized facts

Technical

Expected Return of each agent

$$r_{e,j}^t = \frac{1}{\sum_i w_{i,j}} \left( w_{1,j} \log \frac{P_f}{P^{t-1}} + w_{2,j} \log \frac{P^{t-1}}{P^{t-\tau_j}} + w_{3,j} \varepsilon_j^t \right)$$

Parameters for agents

$w_{i,j}$  and  $\tau_j$

Random of Uniform Distribution

$w_{i,j}$  i=1,3: 0~1  
i=2: 0~100  
 $\tau_j$  0~10000

Fundamental

$P_f$  Fundamental Price  
10000 = constant  
 $P^t$  Market Price at t

This term is needed to prevent the prices go out far away

noise

$\varepsilon_j^t$   
Random of Normal Distribution  
Average=0  
 $\sigma=3\%$

To keep agents varied  
To keep simulation runs stably

Expected Price of each agent

$$P_{e,j}^t = P^t \exp(r_{e,j}^t)$$

## Fundamental Strategy


Fundamental Price  $>$  Market Price  $\rightarrow$  Expect + return

Fundamental Price  $<$  Market Price  $\rightarrow$  Expect - return

## Technical Strategy (Historical Return)


Historical Return  $>$  0  $\rightarrow$  Expect + return

Historical Return  $<$  0  $\rightarrow$  Expect - return



# Erroneous orders

Erroneous orders period  
30000-60000




Within the period, with a constant probability 8% for the future, 40% for the L-ETF  
each order of the NAs is changed to sell with very low price  
    <- same total erroneous orders

Increasing such erroneous sell orders is what makes market prices fall

# Arbitrage Agent (AA)

## Frequency of Trades



The AA places an order and cancel an order any time







# Price Relationship between L-ETF and Futures

Process of an arbitrage in real financial markets is very complex, e. g., a ratio that investors can equivalent-exchange the L-ETF for the futures are pass-depended of time evolution of their market prices.

In this study, the process of an arbitrage was modelized very simply

The Leverage is twice (x2)

$$\text{L-ETF Return} = 2 \times \text{Futures Return}$$

	Fundamental P	Market Prices	Price Change Range	Example of Price Change	Example of Return
 Futures	10000	about 10000	---	+500 	5% 
 L-ETF	5000	about 5000	same as futures	+500  same	10%  Twice

This means


$$\text{L-ETF Price} = \text{Futures Price} - 5000$$

Arbitrage Agent

place orders to maintain the price relationship



Immediately executed  
arbitrage-trades

	L-ETF				Futures		
	Sell	Price	Buy		Sell	Price	Buy
	7	5030			30	10400	
	10	5020			44	10300	
	7	5010		AA	70	10200	
	12	5000			134	10100	
Best Sell Price	8	4990				10000	120
Best Buy Price		4980	10			9900	88
		4970	6			9800	52
		4960	4			9700	25

Usually best sell price > best buy price, rarely can be reversed when orders from two different exchanges are combined

AA can earn to buy at the best sell price and sell at the best buy price

If  $L\text{-ETF best Sell} + 5000 < \text{Future best Buy}$  Buy L-ETF Sell Futures

If  $\text{Futures best Sell} - 5000 < L\text{-ETF best Buy}$  Buy Futures Sell L-ETF

Taking all arbitrage opportunities at that moment

# Arbitrage-trades by waiting orders

L-ETF		Futures	
Sell	Price	Buy	Buy
7	5030		30
10	5020		44
	5010		70
	5000	1	134
	4990		120
	4980	10	88
	4970	6	52
	4960	4	25

AA

Wait

Immediately Sell

After waiting order executed

AA places the waiting order to earn by immediately executing for another asset

If  $L\text{-ETF best Buy} < \text{Futures best Buy} - 5000 < L\text{-ETF best Sell}$

Placing buy waiting order at  $\text{Futures best Buy} - 5000$  on L-ETF


When the waiting order is executed, AA sells Futures

$L\text{-ETF best Buy} < \text{Futures best Sell} - 5000 < L\text{-ETF best Sell}$ , vice versa


# L-ETF Agent

The L-ETFA decides every 10 if it rebalance-trades

Holding  
Futures



L-ETF Agent



To maintain leverage twice, it should holds

$$S_0 \times (\text{Future Price} / 10000)$$

It trades when different more than 1%

Buy the futures when its price goes up  
Sell the futures when its price goes down

This Rebalance makes  
Financial Market Unstable?

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
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# Time evolution of L-ETF prices

AA reduces the fall


Liquidity of the futures is consumed to prevent the fall of the L-ETF


Rebalance-trades make enlarge the fall of market prices



- Without either the erroneous orders nor the AA
- Without the AA
- Without the rebalance-trades
- With the rebalance-trades( $S_0=50000$ )

# Arbitrage

	L-ETF			Futures		
	Sell	Price	Buy	Sell	Price	Buy
 NAs	7	5030		30	10400	
	10	5020		44	10300	
	7	5010		70	10200	
	12	5000		134	10100	
	8	4990			10000	120
				10	9900	88
			6	9800	52	
			4	9700	25	



  
 AA

Red arrows indicate: NAs sell L-ETF at price 4990 (8 units) and AA buy L-ETF at price 4990 (10 units). AA then sell Futures at price 10000 (120 units).

NAs sell L-ETF -> AA buy L-ETF -> AA Sell Futures  
 So, NAs sell futures indirectly

Liquidity of the futures is consumed to prevent the fall of the L-ETF  
 Liquidity of the futures is used as hidden liquidity of the L-ETF

# Time evolution of L-ETF and Futures prices with AA




The two lines overlap each other when the market prices of the L-ETF change double with those of the futures

# Case with the erroneous orders to the L-ETF for several S0

Consuming liquidity of the futures reduces falling of the L-ETF, on the other hand, the futures also fall.

Larger the L-ETF (larger S0), larger falling for both the L-ETF and the futures

Destroying markets with too big L-ETF ( $S_0 > 100000$ )



- Falling depth of the L-ETF (left)
- ×— Falling depth of the futures (left)
- △— The amount of rebalance-sell orders of the AA (right)




# Case with the erroneous orders to the Futures for several S0

Without AA,  
The falling is not so deep  
than the case of L-ETF.  
Erroneous orders to  
Futures are less than L-ETF


But with AA the results are  
almost same as the  
previous case

Investors of L-ETFs have  
great benefit by gaining much  
liquidity of futures.  
On the other hand,  
Investors of futures do not have



- Falling depth of the L-ETF (left)
- × Falling depth of the futures (left)
- △ The amount of rebalance-sell orders of the AA (right)

# Mechanism of destroying markets with too big L-ETF ( $S_0 > 100000$ )



Sells largely impact to market prices, the futures fall more, the L-ETF should additionally sell the futures

Such process continues as loop and falling can not stop

This result is consistent with [Yagi 2016]

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- ✓ In this study, the artificial market model was built by adding a market in which a L-ETF itself is traded and adding a erroneous orders leading turmoil implemented by the model of [Mizuta 2016] to the prior model of [Yagi 2020]. We investigated that sharply falling of the futures or the L-ETF affects the another market and effects of rebalancing trades of the L-ETF.
- ✓ In the result, the erroneous orders to the L-ETF leads that market prices of the L-ETF fall, but the arbitrage-trades reduce the fall. Here, waiting buy orders to the futures, not to the L-ETF, are executed and reduced because a sell order of a normal agent executes a buy order of the AA and then the AA sells the futures. The buy orders of the AA to the L-ETF reduce the fall of the L-ETF. The reason why the AA can buy the L-ETF is that the AA can consume the waiting buy orders of the futures. In short, liquidity of the futures is consumed to prevent the fall of the L-ETF. This means that liquidity of the futures is used as hidden liquidity of the L-ETF.

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- ✓ In the case that the erroneous orders to the futures, the arbitrage-trades by the AA mix and combine liquidity of the L-ETF and futures, therefore, same falling happens even which to the L-ETF or the futures the erroneous orders come. The futures can gain only a less liquidity from the L-ETF that has a less liquidity, then this leads not to reduce falling so much. In real financial market, this means that investors of L-ETFs have great benefit by gaining much liquidity of futures, on the other hand, investors of futures do not have so benefit by gaining low liquidity of L-ETFs.
- ✓ Larger the L-ETF, larger falling for both the L-ETF and the futures. When  $S_0 > 100000$ , the simulation can not run due to too large falling of market prices. This means that markets are destroyed. When the futures fall, the L-ETF sells futures. Here, when the L-ETF is so big, the futures also fall, and then the number of futures the L-ETF should sell is larger, finally, the L-ETF should additionally sell the futures. Such process continues as loop and falling can not stop. This leads to destroy the markets.

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- ✓ The difference in results in the case of erroneous orders to the futures or L-ETF may depend only on the lower liquidity. This is a future work.
- ✓ Note that an arbitrage in real financial markets is extremely more complex than our model. In the actual, market prices of L-ETFs do not track precisely like as our model. Some process existing in real financial market but not included in our model could be important. All of them are future works.

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<https://mizutatakanobu.com/2024CIFEr.pdf>

## References

- [Yagi 2016] Yagi, I., Mizuta, T., “Analysis of the Impact of Leveraged ETF Rebalancing Trades on the Underlying Asset Market Using Artificial Market Simulation”, 12th Artificial Economics Conference, September 20-21, 2016 [http://ae2016.it/public/ae2016/files/ssc2016\\_Mizuta.pdf](http://ae2016.it/public/ae2016/files/ssc2016_Mizuta.pdf)
- [Yagi 2020] Yagi, I., Maruyama, S., Mizuta, T., “Trading strategies of a leveraged ETF in a continuous double auction market using an agent-based simulation”, Complexity, 2020  
<https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/3497689>

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# References (Reviews of agent-based models for a financial market)

## Review of an agent-based model for designing a financial market

Mizuta (2020) An agent-based model for designing a financial market that works well, CIFEr 2020  
arXiv <https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.06000>

Slide: <https://mizutatakanobu.com/2021kyushu.pdf>

YouTube: <https://youtu.be/rmlb72ykmlE>

Mizuta (2022) Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Financial Markets: A Good AI for Designing Better Financial Markets and a Bad AI for Manipulating Markets [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0937-5\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0937-5_13)

## Citing many previous studies

Mizuta (2016) A Brief Review of Recent Artificial Market Simulation Studies for Financial Market Regulations And/Or Rules, SSRN Working Paper Series

<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710495>

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
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# Appendix

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# Order Price and Buy or Sell



To replicate many waiting limit orders,  
order price is scattered around expected price

NA places one **buy** order when order price > expected price  
NA places one **sell** order when order price < expected price

## Verification: Stylized Facts

The purpose of simulation is understanding the reasons and mechanism, not replicating ALL Stylized Facts

The simplicity of the model is very important because unnecessary replication of macro phenomena leads to models that are overfitted and too complex. Such models prevent understanding and discovery of mechanisms affecting price formation because of the increase in related factors.

Many empirical studies, e.g., Sewell 2006 have shown that both stylized facts (fat-tail and volatility-clustering) exist statistically in almost all financial markets. Conversely, they also have shown that only the fat-tail and volatility-clustering are stable for any asset and in any period because financial markets are generally unstable.

Fat-tail

1 to 100

kurtosis of price returns is positive

Volatility-clustering

0 to 0.2

square returns have a positive auto-correlation

The magnitudes of these values are unstable and vary greatly depending on the asset and/or period.

For the above reasons, an artificial market model should replicate these values as significantly positive and within a reasonable range as I mentioned. It is not essential for the model to replicate specific values of stylized facts because the values of these facts are unstable in actual financial markets.

**TABLE I**  
**STYLIZED FACTS WITHOUT THE ERRONEOUS ORDERS FOR THE FUTURES**

kurtosis or returns		4.32
	lag	
	1	0.130
autocorrelation	2	0.081
coefficient for	3	0.065
square returns	4	0.054
	5	0.045

The model of Chiarella (2002) is very simple but replicates long-term statistical characteristics observed in actual financial markets: a fat tail and volatility clustering.

In contrast, Mizuta (2013) replicates high-frequency micro structures, such as execution rates, cancel rates, and one-tick volatility, that cannot be replicated with the model of Chiarella (2002).

The simplicity of the model is very important for this study, because unnecessary replication of macro phenomena leads to models that are overfitted and too complex. Such models prevent understanding and discovery of mechanisms affecting price formation because of the increase in related factors.